Abstract-In this paper, we propose a new service for digital mobile communication systems. The service enables two or more users to hold a secure conference. Two requirements must be considered: privacy and authentication. Privacy involves ensuring that an eavesdropper cannot intercept the conversations of the parties holding the conference. Authentication involves ensuring that service is not obtained fraudulently in order to avoid usage charges. We present two new conference key distribution schemes for digital mobile communication systems. In these schemes, a group of users can generate a common secret key over a public channel so that they may hold a secure conference.
time performance [6] . Private-key cryptosystems are simpler and faster than public-key cryptosystem as far as computational complexity is concerned. But private-key cryptosystems require a tremendous amount of effort for key management and distribution [3] . Private-key cryptosystems require that parties (portable) to the conversation share knowledge of a secret key and that unauthorized users not have access to this key. Key agreement is the process by which the parties agree upon the proper key.
In this paper, we propose a new service for digital mobile communication systems. This service enables two or more users to hold a secure electronic conference. Two requirements must be considered: privacy and authentication. Privacy involves ensuring an eavesdropper cannot intercept conversations during a conference or information about conferees' locations. Authentication involves ensuring that service is not obtained fraudulently in order to avoid charges for usage. We thus have the following four security goals for the mobile communication system: 1) Privacy of conversation content during the conference.
2) Privacy of information about conferees' locations during the conference. 3) Prevention of fraud by ensuring that the portable units are authentic. 4) Prevention of replaying attacks, so that intruders are not able to obtain sensitive data by replaying a previously intercepted message. Since the portable units must operate over long periods of time on small, low-power batteries, low complexity implementation of the encryption function is critical. Private-key cryptosystems meet such criteria [2] . As mentioned above, private-key cryptosystems require a session key agreed upon by the conferees in the conference.
In this paper, we present two new conference key distribution schemes for digital mobile communication systems. In these schemes, a group of conferees can obtain a common secret key over a public channel and use it to hold a secure conference. Since the computation needed to obtain the common secret session key is relatively simple, our scheme can be used in low-cost, low-power mobile communications. The complexity of our schemes will be analyzed in Section V. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review previous key distribution schemes and the problems that arise when they are applied to mobile communication systems. In Section 111, we present two new schemes for mobile communication systems. In Section IV, we analyze the security of our schemes. In Section V, we discuss and evaluate Since these schemes involve a high computational complexity (modular exponentiation) as the fundamental arithmetic, they are not suitable for use in low-cost, low-power mobile communication systems. Below two new conference key distribution schemes are proposed for low complexity digital mobile communication systems. In our schemes, a group of conferees can generate a common secret key over the public channel to hold a secure conference.
Two NEW EFFICIENT SCHEMES
In this section we present two conference key distribution protocols for digital mobile communications. The first is based on public-key cryptography. In this scheme, the network center need not keep the secret keys of all conferees. The other is based on private-key cryptography. The scheme can easily be implemented using hardware-limited terminals, but the network center needs to keep the secret keys of all conferees.
Without loss of generality, let user terminal TI be the terminal logged in by the chairperson U,, who initiates the secure electronic conference with rn conferees, U1, U,, . . . , U,.
Moreover, let NC be the network center; Ti the user terminal logged in by Ui; ID, the unique identity of Ui; CK1 and CK2 the random numbers generated by T,; and t, the date and time at which message is sent. The symbol 11 denotes a concatenation of two numbers. NC generates each user U,'s secret information s, from ID, and s, = f(ID,), where f is a secret one-way function which only the network center knows.
Protocol 1: This protocol for conference key distribution is based on asymmetric key cryptography. We use the RSA cryptographic method as the asymmetric cryptosystem. In the following protocol, the modulus n is a product of p and q, where y and q are large prime numbers. The encryption exponent e is chosen to be 3. The decryption exponent d is a number satisfying ed mod 4(n) = 1, where $(n) denotes the Euler's totient function of n. This key distribution protocol, which is illustrated in Fig. 1 , can be summarized as follows.
) Conference Key Distribution Protocol I (CKDPI):
Step 1: Initial terminal Tl chooses random numbers CK1
and CK2, and the key CK = CK1 + CK2 is chosen as the common secret session key.
mod n to the network center (NC).
Step 3: NC decrypts the encrypted data signal and obtains (tlllslllCK1I(CK2I(ID2, z = l , . . . . m ) . NC extracts t l , SI, CK1, CKp, and ID,, z = 1.. . . , m from the decrypted data.
NC checks the validity of the timestamp tl. NC verifies TI and computes CK = CK1 + CK2.
Step 4: NC calls the terminals of the other conferees. NC randomly chooses a coefficient a which is securely known only by NC and then constructs a polynomial of one degree y = CK + ax mod n. NC also randomly chooses xo and obtains yo from y = CK + ax mod n.
Step 2: TI sends (tllls111CK111CK2111D,, z = 1 , . . . f , I l~, I I~, I l~~, Step 5: Each terminal, Ti, i = 2 , . . . , m, chooses random numbers xi1 and xi2 as a key-encryption key.
Step 6: Each Ti, i = 2 , . . . , m sends ( t i~~s i~~z i 1
I( x;2111D;)3 mod n to NC.
Step 7: NC decrypts the encrypted data signal and obtains
( t i~~~~i~~x i l~~x i~~~I D i ) .
NC extracts t i , s i , xi1, xi2, and IDi from the decrypted data. NC checks the validity of the timestamp t i . NC verifies Ti and computes xi = zil + xi2.
Step 8: NC obtains yi, i = 2 , . . . , m by substituting z; into the equation y; = CK + ax; mod n.
Step 9: NC broadcasts (ZO, yo, y2, y3, .. . , ym) to Ti, i = 2, .. . , m.
Step 10: Ti computes the common secret session key of Tis, CK = yi -( X , -X J xi mod n.
Protocol 2: This protocol for conference key distribution is based on symmetric key cryptography. We use secure privatekey encryption and decryption algorithms as the symmetric cryptosystem. In the following protocol, we assume that all terminals in the system are capable of secret private-key encryption and decryption. Let E and D denote secure privatekey encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively. For the plaintext M , the following equation holds
where s is the private key used in the symmetric cryptosystem. The key distribution protocol, illustrated in Fig. 2 , can be summarized as follows.
2) Conference Key Distribution Protocol 2 (CKDP2):
Step 1: Initial terminal, TI, generates CK as a common secret session key.
Step 2: TI sends E s l ( t 1~~I D 1 1~I D 2~~
. . . IIID,IICK) to NC.
Step 3: NC decrypts the encrypted data signal and obtains (tlllID1(IID2II.. . llIDmIICK). NC extracts t l , ID1, ID2, . . . ,ID, and CK from the decrypted data. NC checks the validity of the timestamp t l and verifies Tl.
Step 4: NC calls the terminals of the other conferees. NC randomly chooses a coefficient U which is securely known only by NC and then constructs a polynomial of one degree y = CK + a z mod n. NC also randomly chooses xo and obtains yo from y = CK + az mod n.
Step 5: Each terminal Ti, i = 2 , . . . . m , generates xi as a key-encryption key.
Step 6: Each Ti, i = 2 , . . . , m sends E s t ( t~~~I D~~~x~) to NC.
Step 7: NC decrypts the encrypted data signal and obtains (til [IDillxi) . NC extracts t i , IDi and z, from the decrypted data. NC checks the validity of the timestamp t i and verifies Ti.
Step 8: NC obtains yi, i = 2:. . . , m by substituting xi into equation yi = CK + axi mod n.
Step 9: NC broadcasts (xo, yo: y2. y3? . . . , ym) to Ti, i = 2 : . . . , nl.
Step 10: Ti computes the common secret session key with Tis, CK = pi -( z ) x z mod n.
If a user is one of the legal conferees, he can obtain the secret session key CK(=y, -(-)xi mod n) by solving the following simultaneous equations (2)
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we shall show that user authentication and session key distribution are both addressed in our schemes.
The network center will authenticate the chairperson's identification ID1 by checking the correctness of ID1 at step 3 of the proposed protocols. Similarly, the network center can authenticate the identification ID, of other users invited by the chairperson to participate in the conference by checking the correctness of ID, at Step 7 of the proposed protocols. Therefore, the above protocols ensure that a portable unit cannot access the network using a false identity in order to avoid charges for usage.
Since the common secret session key CK is sent to the network center by an encryption function, an intruder cannot decipher CK unless he knows the secret key of the network center in the CKDPl protocol or the private key of conferees in the CKDP2 protocol. Therefore, the conferees can hold a secure conversation.
Similarly, the location of conferees is protected by the above-mentioned encryption function. It is difficult for an intruder to obtain the location of ID, from the ... llIDmIICK) of step 2 in the CKDP2 protocol.
Basically, Steps 8, 9, and 10 in the proposed protocols are implementations of Shamir's (2, m) threshold scheme [ 191. Therefore, revealing the secret conference key of our schemes is equivalent to nullifying the Shamir threshold scheme.
In order to pass the verification of Step 3 and Step 7 in our protocols, an intruder must change t, into a new time t* such that (T" -t * ) 5 AT, where T" is the time when the system receives the illegal login message and AT is the expected legal time interval for transmission delay. Once t, is changed, an intruder will fail the verification of Step 3 and Step 7 in the proposed protocols. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against replaying attacks.
V. COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS
The computational complexity of our schemes in the portable is dominated by the computation of Steps 6 and 10 in the CKDPl and CKDP2 protocols. This computation requires only 3 modular multiplications (2 for Step 6, 1 for step lo), 1 modular division, and 3 subtractions for Step 10 in CKDPl.
The computation of Step 6 in CKDP2 is based on that of the private-key encryption algorithms. If DES is used as the symmetric cryptosystem, it partitions the data text into blocks of 64 b each. This requires
where DES(64) is the time required to encipher 64 b of text using the DES device and is the length of the encrypted data.
Assume that each ti, ID,, and xi of Step 6 in CKDP2 is an integer 256 b in length. Thus TDES = 12 * DES(64).
DES has been implemented both in software and in hardware. Hardware implementations achieve encryption rates of 1 Gbs [5]. A software implementation of DES on an Intel 80486133 MHz microprocessor can perform 2.6 million bps; one on a Motorola 68020/16 MHz microprocessor can perform 0.22 million bps [la] . Therefore, TDES is equal to 0.8 ps using hardware implementation and 4.6 ps using software implementation. The computation requires only one modular multiplication, one modular division, and three subtractions for Step 10 in CKDP2. This is achievable in real time by a portable unit. Thus, our schemes are practical for implementation in a low-cost, low-power secure mobile communication system.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Mobile communication systems consist of mobile switching centers, base stations, and portable units. Since the mobile switching centers and base stations generally reside at a fixed location, the switching centers and base stations can be installed using high-power, high-cost mechanisms. However, the portables are movable and are carried by persons or on vehicles. Since the portables must operate over long periods of time on small low-power batteries, low complexity implementation is critical.
One mobile switching center can service many base stations, and one base station can service many portables. Thus, mobile communication systems can be geographically regarded as a star-type network. The role of the network center in our schemes can be taken over by the base station or the mobile switching center, both of which can perform complex computations in a reasonable time. In comparison, the portables are required to perform only relatively simple computations, as showed in Section V. Thus, our schemes are suitable for low-cost, low-power mobile communication systems.
Since the fundamental arithmetic of conventional conference key distribution schemes is extremely complex, these schemes are not suitable for use in low-cost, low-power mobile communication systems. The two simple but effective schemes proposed here for holding secure electronic conferences in digital mobile communication systems enable hardware-limited user terminals to obtain a common secret conference key in a reasonable time.
The CKDP2 protocol is implemented using a private-key encryption algorithm, and thus requires less hardware complexity than the CKDPl protocol, which is implemented with a public-key encryption algorithm. However, the CKDP2 protocol requires key management at the network center. Both user authentication and key distribution are considered in the proposed schemes. Another feature of our schemes is that the chairperson can freely choose a common key CK shared among all legitimately intended principals and himself. 
